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China is emerging as an increasingly important player in the global development space, but
may be less bound to compacts that aim to curb political preferencing and therefore may
produce less yield in terms of impact toward Sustainable Development Goals. This research
tests the hypothesis that the disproportionate aid allocation to the birth regions of the current
African political leaders that applies to some sectors more than others.
Design
We applied a two-part model to first estimate the probability that a region receives an aid
project. Then when at least one aid project is present in a leader’s birth region, we estimated
the mean amount of aid the region received.
Setting
This analysis covers 699 subnational units (first administrative level) across 44 African
countries over 2000–2014. These administrative units were compiled into a region year
panel resulting in 10,485 observations.
Results
Birth regions of the current political leader are significantly more likely than the average of all
of the regions to receive education (1.3 percentage points), social infrastructure and ser-
vices (1.2 percentage points), and energy aid (1.7 percentage points). No significant associ-
ation was found between aid flows to the birth region of the current political leader in the
agriculture, communication, education, government, health or transportation sectors. Within
the education sector, the coefficients for birth region are positive in both parts and statisti-
cally significant. Both the probability of aid allocation and the amount of aid conditional on
any projects increase in the birth region of the current political leader.
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Conclusions
This sector-specific analysis provides a more nuanced picture of Chinese aid than previous
analyses that determine the presence of political preference according to aggregate aid
flows. The sectors where political preferencing exists are also those sectors that are typi-
cally associated with limited counterfactual-based program evaluation. We present evi-
dence that demonstrates the importance of disaggregating aid flows in order to support a
new policy framework designed to target the Sustainable Development Goals.
1. Introduction
Chinese aid, although not a new phenomenon, has dramatically expanded in recent years [1].
According to a recent estimate, from 2010 to 2015, emerging bilateral donors increased their
annual aid by 47%; China is the biggest donor among them [2]. Many of these emerging
donors, including China, are not part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and therefore are not
required to report their aid flows nor abide by conventional aid effectiveness principles [3].
China has published ad hoc documentation of its foreign aid contributions, yet its defini-
tion of aid does not align with OECD standards. Its self-published foreign aid flows are at the
aggregate level and do not provide much insight into specific projects or recipients[1]. In
response to this data transparency challenge, several estimates of Chinese aid were developed
to attempt to align aid flows with OECD standards. Using common standards to measure and
track aid also allows for comparison between OECD and non-OECD donors. Strange et al.
estimated that China’s financial commitments to Africa 2000 to 2011 accounted for approxi-
mately $75 billion US dollars through 1673 projects [4]. Other analyses of Chinese aid efforts
show that China’s net foreign aid was $4.5 billion dollars in 2011, $5.7 billion in 2012, and $7.1
billion in 2013 [5].
The lack of transparent aid information has led some to label China a ‘rogue donor’ who
pursues aid for its own benefit and undermines development policy [6–8]. Recent empirical
analyses show this characterization of China as a rogue donor paints an inaccurate picture
[6,7]. Nonetheless, China’s approach to aid provision differs from that of OECD members and
warrants deeper scrutiny.
China has largely portrayed its development philosophy as “win-win” through which China
offers the provision of infrastructure in exchange for access to natural resources [9]. China
aligns its development policies with its foreign policy principle of non-interference in the
domestic politics of other countries [10]. This raises the question as to whether non-interfer-
ence makes China a favorable, or even preferred, aid provider to its recipients and to what
extent it poses risks such as supporting political favoritism and corruption while weakening
accountability and/or respect for human rights. Dreher et al. found that Chinese aid leads to
“political preferencing”. A dataset covering 1,650 Chinese development projects from 2000 to
2012 showed that when leaders hold power their birth regions receive substantially more Chi-
nese aid flows than other subnational regions [11]. This suggests that Chinese aid flows are sus-
ceptible to manipulation, a phenomenon that may not occur if China was bound to the same
transparency principles as OECD member countries. However, little is known about the deter-
minants of aid flows at the sector level and consequently which sectors are most subject to
manipulation. Both the inability to disaggregate aid information by sector as well as the
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absence of comprehensive data on Chinese aid flows has led to a small body of research aimed
at understanding the determinants of China’s aid provision. Dreher and Fuchs determine that
Chinese aid allocation is significantly influenced by both political and commercial interests
[10]. Other evidence on determinants of bilateral aid from Mishra suggests that recipient need
in the form of population, donor interests, and governance are important [12]. However, Chi-
nese ODA allocation may rely on different motivations depending on the sector examined [7].
In recent years, there have been several studies that examined sectoral motivations for Chinese
aid allocation. This literature remains thin and mostly focuses on the health sector. Guillion
and Mathonnat studied the factors associated with Chinese health ODA to Africa in the 2006–
2013 period. They find that Chinese health aid was responsive to economic needs (measured
as Gross Domestic Product per capita) and favored countries with limited ability to finance
health projects using national funds. There was no evidence of health aid allocation based on
district level needs such as life expectancy, child and maternal mortality, or malaria prevalence
[13]. Results do confirm the idea that health aid is part of China’s foreign policy as non-adher-
ence to the one-China policy makes the receipt of Chinese health aid unlikely. In other work
Zhao, Kennedy, and Tang find GDP as a significant determinant of Chinese health aid alloca-
tion[14]. Using cross-sectional data, Zhao et al. highlights good governance and human rights
as motivations for allocation and finds no evidence of allocation based on bilateral trade or
UN voting affinity[14].
The literature provides very little comprehensive evidence on the more nuanced determi-
nants of Chinese aid allocation at sector levels. Guillon and Mathonnat refine the literature by
studying the determinants of Chinese aid allocation across three broad sectors (social, eco-
nomic, and production) over the 2000–2014 period[13]. Their results point to the influence of
GDP in the social and production sectors, but not in the economic sectors[13]. They find that
weaker governance matters in the provision of economic and production aid, but not in the
social sector. When considering all three broad sectors together their results contradict previ-
ous aggregate level research, and indicates that African countries with high endowments of
natural resources tend to receive more Chinese ODA[13]. In sum, the sparse literature con-
cludes that there is a need to disaggregate the analysis by ODA sectors as analyzing overall aid
to Africa can be misleading.
The current study examines political preferencing in China by aid sector, following other
studies that take a sector specific approach to understanding aid allocation in China [14–16].
Aggregate analyses such as Dreher et al.’s, illuminated an alarming phenomenon[11]. How-
ever, such aggregate analyses ignore the fact that China’s aid system has traditionally been frag-
mented in both funding and in management, and therefore lacked a unified cross-sector
strategy. Chinese aid was only recently reorganized under a single aid agency, the Chinese
International Development and Cooperation Agency, and therefore analyses of aggregate
flows may mask the behaviors and vulnerabilities within particular dimensions of aid.
Although aggregate analyses are useful for understanding Chinese aid allocation practices and
vulnerabilities more broadly, they may mask important details about the dynamics of Chinese
aid provision[16,17]. Thus, it seems particularly likely that sector-specific research into politi-
cal preferencing may reveal stark differences between aid sectors across the Chinese aid
architecture.
This research will test the hypothesis that the disproportionate aid allocation to the birth
regions of the current African political leaders that Dreher et al. [11] found applies to some
sectors more than others. This may be due to the nature of a given sector and whether it is
more susceptible to pressure to be effective and/or to other forms of oversight. This research
builds on the existing literature in two distinct ways. First, disaggregating total aid into sectors
of aid make it possible to identify distinctive vulnerabilities among particular sectors[18].
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Second, sector level aid flows are challenging to model because the data is highly skewed data
with substantial amount of zero values. In this research, we extend the research by modeling
the sector level outcomes with a two-part model, instead of a single-equation model.
2. Conceptual framework
In this research, the Theory of Change was used to examine the links between the determi-
nants of Chinese aid allocation, the placement of Chinese aid projects, and the role of political
preferencing [19]. This theory is an outcomes-based approach that describes a sequence of
events that is expected to lead to a particular outcome. It is increasingly being used in interna-
tional development by governmental, bilateral, and multilateral development agencies, civil
society organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and research programs
intended to support development outcomes [20]. The Theory of Change is flexible and may be
visually represented in different ways, but the basic elements include (i) the context for the aid
intervention, (ii) long-term change that the aid intervention seeks to support, (iii) the sequence
of change, and (iv) assumptions about how these changes might happen [20]. In this study, we
assume that donor aid is used to procure and distribute development interventions, which
must be properly deployed to produce desired outcomes. A disconnect between interventions
and desired aid outcomes may result from breakdowns where aid flows are determined. To
better understand where such disconnects may occur in the allocation process, this study
assesses indicators relevant to three key determinants of bilateral aid allocation: recipient gov-
ernment behavior, donor interests, and recipient need. The literature provides very little com-
prehensive evidence on the more nuanced determinants of Chinese aid allocation at sector
levels. However, it does contribute to the conceptual model linking aid determinants and aid
flows. Within our conceptual framework we expect that aid in the social and humanitarian sec-
tors (education, health, government, emergency, multisector and social) to be linked with the
development of human resources and therefore be related to recipient needs. Whereas, aid to
the economic and production sectors (communication, transportation, agriculture, and
energy) should reflect Chinese economic interests. The key factors assessed within these three
determinants of aid allocation and rationale for its selection are outlined in the subsequent
section.
2.1 Political preferencing/government
Importantly for this paper, political preferencing is also a determinant of aid flows and may
result in inefficient aid allocation, which would subsequently alter aid interventions, outcomes,
and impact [11]. Further, some aid sectors may be more vulnerable to political preferencing
than others, creating differential adverse impacts across sectors downstream. To this point, we
follow Rajan and Subramanian, and instead of examining aid either in the aggregate or in a
more narrow framework, we take a comprehensive perspective and examine aid according to
“the use to which aid is put” by broad sectors[21]. In addition, literature has demonstrated that
countries that democratize receive more aid [22]. Following the standard in the literature on
democratization, Polity IV is used as an empirical measure of recipient levels of democracy.
2.2 Donor interests
In the conceptual model, economic resources (e.g., mines, oil/gas, ports) are included to con-
trol for the claim that Chinese aid is driven by an interest in accessing natural resources
[11,23]. Chinese financing to Africa has been linked to the controversial “Angola Model”
where China provides low interest loans to countries that rely on commodities, such as oil,
minerals, and gas [24]. From 2004 to 2011, China made these deals to at least seven resource-
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rich African countries totaling USD$14 billion [24]. In addition to directly controlling for
national resources, ports were included to control for China’s interest in facilitating the import
and export of goods to support what has been termed as China’s “Maritime Silk Road” [25]. In
2006, trade between Africa and China totaled more than $50 billion, with oil imports from
Angola and Sudan, timber from Central Africa, and copper from Zambia [26].
2.3 Recipient need
Measures of recipient need include geographic area of the country, population size, and road
density. Nighttime light intensity is also included as a proxy for economic activity at the subna-
tional level. Geographic area of the country as an indicator of recipient need is a key element
in the aid allocation process for bilateral donors, such as China [12]. In addition, the number
of people living in an area has been demonstrated to introduce systematic bias in the allocation
of aid. In general, less populous countries receive more per capita aid than more populous
ones [22,27,28]. A wide range of explanations have been offered for this negative relationship,
including decreasing marginal benefit as population increases, limited capacity of large coun-
tries to absorb an additional amount of aid, and the potential of greater aid effectiveness in
small countries [28]. Capital cities were included to control for the claim that a disproportion-
ate amount of aid goes to capital cities. This could be politically motivated, meaning that
unrest in capital cities is uniquely dangerous to recipient governments headquartered in the
capital [29–31]. Other research finds aid is disproportionately allocated to the capital, not
because that is where the people are but because it is where the wealthiest people are located,
and these people are the target of resource transfers such as aid [30]. Next, the density of roads
is included as a measure of recipient need as the length of road in a region proxies for infra-
structure and capacity to support aid interventions [11]. Finally, nighttime light intensity is
used extensively in the literature as a proxy for economic activity when subnational GDP is
not available [32–34].
3. Methods
Our empirical analysis follows closely the large-scale analysis in Dreher et al[11], who study
whether foreign aid from China is prone to political capture in aid-receiving countries. Our
method differs from Dreher in several ways. We are not comparing the subnational allocation
of Chinese and World Bank development finance. Instead, we focus explicitly on Chinese aid
flows to explore whether or not this favoritism exists when aid flows are further disaggregated
into sectors. Second, we use an expanded analysis sample to include aid flows and political
leader data through 2014. Third, given the lack of literature on sector level Chinese aid alloca-
tion we exclude the role of elections in this analysis and focus on a more general set of covari-
ates. S1 Table provides a detailed comparison of our variables to the variables used by Dreher
et al.[11]. Finally, sector level aid flows are challenging to model because the data is highly
skewed data with substantial amount of zero values. We explicitly model the zero aid outcome
by a two-part model approach. The regression method we selected is a meaningful alternative
and provides policy-relevant estimates.
This analysis draws data from ten secondary data sources. Sources used include data col-
lected by government agencies, think tanks, and academic centers. Table 1 indicates the vari-
ables that were used from each data source.
3.1 Chinese aid to Africa
AidData’s Chinese Official Finance Dataset 2000–2014, version 1, provided georeferenced
project-level data on Chinese aid to Africa [6]. The aid data set was constructed using open-
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source methodology, called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF), designed to col-
lect project-level data from a variety of sources from suppliers of official finance who do not
participate in global reporting systems such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia [35]. This data
set codes all Chinese official financing activities in adherence with OECD definitions. This
data set codes all Chinese official financing activities in adherence with OECD definitions:
Official Development Assistance (ODA)-like, Other Official Flows (OOF)-like, or Vague (Offi-
cial Finance). Projects coded as Vague Official Finance had insufficient information to confi-
dently classify as ODA-like or OOF-like, and were therefore excluded from the analysis as is
consistent practice with other academic works. Vague Official Finance had insufficient infor-
mation to confidently classify as ODA-like or OFF-like and therefore were excluded from the
analysis.[35,36]. For projects that are implemented in more than one location, AidData




All Aidict All official financing activities coded as Official
Development Assistance and Other Official
Flows






All official financing activities coded as Official
Development Assistance and Other Official
Flows
AidData. 2017. Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset,
Version 1.0
Time Varying Controls
Birthregionict = 1 if the political leader of country c in year t
was born in administrative region i, 0 otherwise
Dreher A, Fuchs A, Hodler R, Parks B, Raschky P, Tierney M.
Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of
China’s Foreign Assistance. AidData Working Papers.
October 2016. Archgios. A Data Set on Leaders 1875–2015
Version 4.1
Time Invariant Controls
Lightic Log of the average nighttime light intensity of
the pixels in region i of country c in 2000 (i.e.
beginning of sample period)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA);
Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series
Areaic Square kilometers of subnational regions Directly calculated from the shapefile of subnational
boundaries
Populationic Sum of the adjusted population count of the
pixels in region i of country c.
Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN); Columbia University.
Capitalic = 1 if the capital city of country c is located in
region i, 0 otherwise
Natural Earth; Populated Places version 3.0.0
RoadDensity ic Total length of roads per square kilometer From the shapefile of subnational boundaries (Area) and
Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN); Columbia University; Global Roads Open Access
Data Set, Version 1 (gROADSv1)
Minesic Log of the sum of mineral facilities in each
subnational region i of country c
United States Geological Survey (USGS); Mineral Resource
Data System; Mineral facilities of Africa and the Middle East
(2006)
Oil Gasic = 1 if parts of an oil or gas field overlap with the
area of subnational region i of country c, 0
otherwise
Lujala, Päivi; Jan Ketil Rød & Nadia Thieme, 2007. Fighting
over Oil: Introducing A New Dataset‘, Conflict Management
and Peace Science 24[3], 239–256.
Portic = 1 if a port is located in region i of country c, 0
otherwise
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; World Port Index
Polityc = 1 country is a autocracy, = 2 if country is a
anocracy, = 3 if country is a democracy in
country c, 0 otherwise
Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t001
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georeferences all locations. Our dependent variables of aid (Aidict,Healthict, Communication-
sict, Educationict, Transportationict,Agricultureict, Emergencyict, Energyict, Governmentict, Socialict)
measure Chinese aid commitments to region i in country c and year t in constant 2014 US dol-
lars. If we know there are Chinese projects in a particular subnational locality, but we have no
information on their monetary amounts we set the dependent variables to 0. This is a slightly
stricter definition of aid than [11]Dreher et al, because we only include in our empirical
approach projects that have both location and monetary information.
3.2 Birth region
The main variable of interest is a binary indicator Birthregionict, which indicates the birth
region of the current political leader. Political leader is defined using the definition of coun-
tries’ effective leaders from Goemans et al.’s Archigos dataset, which is a database of political
leaders from 1875–2015[37]. This data was updated to assign ADM1 regions to the birthplaces
of political leaders of African countries.
3.3 Covariates
Time varying and time invariant controls, outlined in Table 1, follow Dreher et al [11]. Night-
time light intensity in the year 2000 (Lightic) is included as a proxy for economic activity,
which is often used when official data on gross domestic project are unavailable or when offi-
cial statistics might be prone to measurement error or manipulation [38,39]. Following Micha-
lopoulos and Papaioann, Hodler and Raschky and Dreher et al. we added 0.01 to the average
nighttime light intensity before taking its logarithm. This ensures that I did not lose observa-
tions with a reported nighttime light intensity of zero.[11,40,41] To control for geographical
and human-population size of subnational regions the variables Areaic and year 2000 Popula-
tionic were included [42,43]. Population was obtained from a Center for International Earth
Science Information Network dataset (GPw4) that provides globally consistent population
data at a disaggregated level [42]. In this research population was used to calculate a consistent
population measure at the regional level. The location of the capital city was added to account
for the role of the country’s capital in aid allocation [44]. To control for the idea that China’s
interest in access to natural resources drives its aid allocation, we included measures for facili-
ties in mines, oil and gas production, and ports (Minesic, OilGasic and Portsic) [45–47]. The
mineral facilities include mines, plants, mills, or refineries of aluminum, cement, coal, copper,
diamond, gold, iron and steel, nickel, platinum-group metals, salt, and silver. We added one
before taking the log. RoadDensityic was included to proxy for the ease of project implementa-
tion based on the transportation infrastructure of the region. It was directly calculated by
dividing total length (km) of roads by square kilometers of subnational regions [43,48]. Polityc
controls for the form of country government: autocracies (characterized by authoritarian
rule), anocracies (neither full democracies nor full autocracies), or democracies (institutional-
ized procedures for open and competitive political participation) [49]. We added binary indi-
cators (Beforeict/Afterict) to control for the two years before and two years after a region is the
birth region of the political leader. Country-fixed effects control for unobserved time-invariant
country characteristics that may be associated with aid placement. Year-fixed effects control
for annual variation in aid flows that are not attributed to other explanatory variables.
3.4 Region selection
Africa was selected for this analysis for several reasons. First, political conflict across Africa is
often linked to pervasive use of patronage in retaining control. Leaders across the region hold
onto offices by purchasing support through the distribution of state resources [50]. Therefore
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understanding measures of patronage, such as aid from China, is appropriate to understand
the government’s controlling influence in aid outcomes. Second, China states it spends more
than half of its foreign aid in 51 African countries [51]. Finally, AidData’s database provides an
opportunity to examine sector-level and project level flows to China’s largest aid recipient
region. Within the existing available data, there are sufficient projects to estimate the associa-
tion between Chinese aid sectors and sector-specific aid allocation to birth region of the cur-
rent political leader.
4. Sample
This analysis covers subnational units of 44 African countries available in the AidData geore-
ferenced dataset over the 2000–2014 period. Five small island states were excluded: Cape
Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Prı́ncipe, Mauritius, and Seychelles. Also excluded was, and
Somalia since it lacks a central government. Four additional countries (Burkina Faso, Gambia,
Libya and Swaziland) were excluded, because no Chinese aid was allocated between 2000–
2014. Subnational units are those at the first administrative level (ADM1) such as regions,
provinces, states, or districts. There are 699 ADM1 regions across the 44 African countries in
this sample that were compiled into a region year panel resulting in 10,485 observations.
AidData’s dataset uses a coding system comparable to the OECD Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem, which assigns a standardized code for each project that reflects the sector targeted by the
project. Specifically, sector coding is done by answering the question: “which specific area of
the recipient’s economic or social structure is the transfer intended to foster?”[4,52] There are
21 sectors of aid in the subnational dataset. This analysis focuses on 9 of these sectors, which
account for 95% of Chinese aid projects recorded as ODA-like aid from 2000 to 2014. The sec-
tors included in the analysis are: education (CRS Code110); health (including water, sanitation,
and hygiene) (CRS Codes 120, 130, and 140); government and civil society (CRS Code 150);
other social infrastructure and services (CRS Code 160); transport and storage (CRS Code
210); communications (CRS Code 220); energy generation and supply (CRS Code 230); and
emergency (CRS Code 700). The remaining sectors were excluded from the analysis due to
either insufficient number of project locations or unspecified sector coding in the AidData
dataset (S1 Appendix). Table 2 indicates the amount of aid and the count of project locations
by sector.
The final analytic dataset (n = 10,485) is a region year panel designed to define the years a
political leader is in power. In total, the dataset represents USD$41.5 in ODA or OOF-like aid
Table 2. Amount of aid and project locations by sector.











� $USD; M = Millions, B = Billions
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t002
PLOS ONE Political preferencing of Chinese aid to Africa
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126 April 22, 2020 8 / 18
and covers 1,950 project-locations for which the geographical information was geocoded at an
ADM1 (province, region, or district) level or lower and monetary amounts were known. In
the original data, 68% of geocoded project locations have information on their respective
financial commitments.
5. Statistical analysis
The objective of this study is to estimate whether more Chinese aid flows to the birth region of
the current political leader in African countries in some sectors relative to others. Two chal-
lenges of the data on aid flows presented themselves immediately. First, a substantial propor-
tion of regions had zero aid flows. Second, positive aid flows were highly skewed. Because of
these features, we used a two-part model [53]. The first part of the two-part model estimates
the probability that a region receives an aid project (= 1 if there is an aid project and 0 if no aid
project is present), specified as a probit regression (Equation 1). The second part is GLM
regression model of how much aid was received, conditional on an aid project being present
(Equation 2). Results from equation 1 are reported as average marginal effects (elasticities) in
order to emphasize the substantive and practical significance of the findings (Table 4). We
used Stata’s twopm command to estimate the two-part model.
6. Results
6.1 Summary statistics
Table 3 lists the characteristics of the sample, which covers 2000 to 2014. The average amount
of total Chinese aid to Africa was US$40.9 million. About, 9.6% of regions had an aid project
and 5.8% of the regions were coded as a leader’s birth region over the study period. At the sec-
tor level, the average amount of aid was highest in the transportation sector ($116m) followed
by the energy and social sectors ($15.9m) and health ($8.9m). The mean nighttime light inten-
sity was 3.8 on a scale of 1 to 63. A majority of regions (69%) were anocracies.
6.2 Main results
We used Stata MP/16.1 to estimate OLS, probit, and GLM (two part) models to obtain param-
eter estimates and marginal effects for two-part aid allocation models. We first estimate the
probability that a region receives an aid project and then when at least one aid project is pres-
ent in a leader’s birth region, we estimated the mean amount of aid the region received. We
used a multivariable gamma regression analyses with a log link. Models were adjusted for capi-
tal region, nighttime lights, population, area, ports, oil, mines, road density, polity, two year
birth region leads and lags, and included year and country fixed effects. The estimated coeffi-
cients for key variables and the associated cluster-robust standard errors are shown in Table 4.
Detailed specification results are shown in S2 Table and S3 Table.
The simple OLS (column 1) of total aid is qualitatively consistent with Dreher et al. and
implies a significant increase (74%) in total financial flows to ADM1 regions containing the
political leaders’ birth place. Moving to the two part model, the marginal effects from the
probit model (column 3) indicate that the birth regions of the current political leader are 2.2
percentage points more likely to have at least some aid, significant at the 10% level. Once the
aid is disaggregated to the sector level, results continue to indicate significant political prefer-
encing. Birth regions of the current political leader are significantly more likely than the aver-
age of all of the regions to receive education (1.3 percentage points), social infrastructure and
services (1.2 percentage points), and energy aid (1.7 percentage points). Although it is impor-
tant to note the social infrastructure sector is based on a small number of project locations
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(n = 92). No significant association was found between aid flows to the birth region of the cur-
rent political leader in the agriculture, communication, education, government, health or
transportation sectors. Within the education sector, the coefficients for birth region are posi-
tive in both parts and statistically significant. Both the probability of aid allocation and the
amount of aid conditional on any projects increase in the birth region of the current political
leader. The two part model was not fully estimated in the agriculture, emergency, government,
or social sectors due to small numbers of ADM1s with an aid sector. This cut point was deter-
mined based on a power analysis conducted in Stata 16.1 powering the research at the .80
level. Aid flows to the communication, government and health sectors in both parts of the
model, indicate that both the probability of aid placement and the amount of aid conditional
on placement decreases in the birth region of the current political leader, although these results
are not statistically significant. Next, (column 5) we show the marginal effects for the com-
bined probit and GLM version of the two-part model. The marginal effect of the birth region
of the current political leader averages about USD$2.1 million for total aid. We also controlled
for the last two years before the political leader came to power and the first two years after they
were out of power. These marginal effects (Table 5) are of particular interest in understanding
the mechanisms of favoritism. Before a political leader is in power results indicate an increase
Table 3. Summary statistics (2000–2014; n = 10,485 ADM1).
VARIABLE PERCENT OF ADM1 OBS MEAN SD MIN MAX
Dependent Variables
Chinese aid
total 9.6 $40.9m $129m $0 $1.3b
agriculture 0.7 $6m $12.9m $0 $46.8m
communication 0.8 $13.2m $36.6m $0 $218m
education 2 4.5m $12.7m $0 $92.6m
emergency 0.4 2.5m $7.6m $0 $48m
energy 0.9 $15.9m $272m $0 $1.3b
government 1 $9.1m $17.8m $0 $106m
health 4.1 $8.9m $55.7m $0 $1b
social 0.7 $15.9m $29m $0 $129m
transportation 1.4 $116m $170m $0 $1b
Independent Variables
Birth Region 5.8 10,485 0.057 0.223 0 1
Area (square kilometers) 100 10,485 37,382 70,498 4.29 639,420
Mines (count) 38 10,485 1.2 3.48 3.67 51
Nighttime Lights (0–63 scale) 96 10,485 3.8 9.75 0 61.086
Population 2000 (count) 98 10,485 26.8m 25.8m 456,703 114m
Road Density (km of road per 100 sq km of land) 99 10,485 0.176 0.366 0 8.3
Capital Region 6.7 10,485 0.067 0.25 0 1
Oil or Gas 16 10,485 0.174 0.379 0 1
Ports 11 10,485 0.105 0.307 0 1




m = million and b = billion; $USD
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t003
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in social aid (4.6 percentage points). Again, there are a limited number of project locations in
the social sector (n = 92) and therefore these results should be interpreted in light of limited
project commitments. After the political leader loses power, results indicate a significant
decrease in aid flows to the education (1.1 percentage points) and government sectors (0.7 per-
centage points).
To be clear, we do not assume that the country level fixed effects and trends account for all
remaining variation in Chinese aid allocation, only that they account for variation that may be
correlated with the timing and country of the political leader. Therefore, it is not possible to
have a causal interpretation for these results since it is not possible to eliminate omitted vari-
able bias at this level of granularity. However, the country and year fixed effects do control for
average differences which might be important to identify the relationship between the leaders
birth regions and aid when we do not have large variation in the leaders’ birth regions. We
Table 4. Results from two part model for total aid by sector, ADM1, 2000–2014a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Probitb dy/dxc GLMd Combined dy/dxd
Total Aid .557 ��� 0.260��� 0.022� 0.025 $2,112,157 ��
(.234) (0.093) (0.008) (0.171) ($1,107,269)
Agriculture 0.248 0.01
(0.260) (0.01)
Communication -0.201 -0.006 -1.181 $-166,000,000
(0.247) (0.007) (0.904) ($413,000,000)
Education 0.437�� .013�� 0.787� $360,420�
(0.194) (0.006) (0.421) ($213,927)
Emergency 0.154 0.003
(0.222) (0.004)
Energy 0.457��� 0.017��� .314 19,600,000
(0.125) (0.004) (0.330) ($15,300,000)
Government -0.024 -0.0001
(0.250) (0.004)
Health -0.005 -0.0002 0.545 $-73418
(0.148) (0.005) (0.521) ($1,274,269)
Social 0.801��� .012���
(0.135) (0.002)
Transportation 0.154 0.005 -0.195 $451,097
(0.133) (0.004) (.201) ($1,315,223)
a The key independent variable of interest is birth region. All models control for capital region, nighttime lights, population, area, ports, oil, mines, road density, polity, 2
year leads and lags for birth regions and include time and country fixed effects.
b Coefficients from part one (probit) of the two-part model. Dependent variable is a binary variable with the value of one if one or more Chinese aid projects have been
committed to an ADM1 region in a given year, and zero otherwise
c Marginal effects from part one (probit of the two-part model)
d Shows the coefficients from part two (GLM) of the two-part model. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the ADM1 level. Dependent variable is aid flows (total
and by sector) given an aid project is present; agriculture, emergency, government and social sectors excluded due to a small number of observations (<65). This cut
point was determined based on a power analysis at the 0.90 level




Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the ADM1 level
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t004
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have 9,878 region-years of data in which the birth region of the current political leader is 0 and
607 in which it is 1-in 5.8% of our data, the region-year represents a birth region of the current
political leader. In terms of region (between), rather than region-years; only 12% of regions
were the birth region to a current political leader at least once. Conditional on a region being
the birth region of the current political leader, 48% of the regions observations have a birth
leader present.
Some readers might be concerned that by avoiding fixed-effects estimation at the region-
level the statistically significant results might be spurious due to omitted variable bias. There-
fore, we go a step further and control for (1) country-year (rather than country, year) and (2)
region fixed effects for the first part of the two part model the probit specification. Table 6
shows estimations from the more rigorous model including country-year fixed effects. When
including country-year fixed effects results remain qualitatively similar. Birth regions of the
Table 5. Marginal effects from probit model for total aid and by sector, ADM1, 2000–2014. Two years before and after political power.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Total Aid Agriculture Communication Education Emergency Energy Government Health Social Transportation
Before 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.009 -0.005 -0.001 0.046� -0.010
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
After -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.011��� 0.006 0.010 -0.007� 0.004 0.036 0.017
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 10,485 1,737 3,569 5,894 3,891 4,563 5,205 7,875 6,076 6,960
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The key independent variable of interest is birth region. All models control for capital region, nighttime lights, population, area, ports, oil, mines, road density, polity, 2
year leads and lags for birth regions and included country and year fixed effects
Dependent variable is a binary variable with the value of one if one or more Chinese aid projects have been committed to an ADM1 region in a given year, and zero
otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at ADM1 level
��� p<0.01, �� p<0.05
� p<0.1
Results are presented as marginal effects
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t005
Table 6. Marginal effects for total aid by sector I, ADM1, 2000–2014.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Total Aid Agriculture Communication Education Emergency Energy Government Health Social Transportation
Birth Region 0.060��� 0.062 0.013 0.096��� 0.026 0.106��� 0.007 0.028 0.067��� 0.042
(0.017) (0.072) (0.082) (0.030) (0.042) (0.029) (0.005) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029)
Observations 4,648 311 361 1,006 448 743 1,028 1,678 739 1,132
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The key independent variable of interest is birth region. All models control for capital region, nighttime lights, population, area, ports, oil, mines, road density, polity, 2
year leads and lags for birth regions and included country-year fixed effects
Dependent variable is a binary variable with the value of one if one or more Chinese aid projects have been committed to an ADM1 region in a given year, and zero
otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at ADM1 level
��� p<0.01, �� p<0.05, �p<0.1
Results are presented as marginal effects
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t006
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current political leader are significantly more likely than the average of all of the regions to
receive some aid. Once aid is disaggregated to the sector level results are again qualitatively
similar in that birth regions of the current political leader are significantly more likely than
average to receive education, social infrastructure and services, and energy aid.
When we include region fixed effects (Table 7) we find few consistent results across models
and sectors. Birth regions of the current political leader are not significantly more likely than
the average of all of the regions to receive some aid. Once aid is disaggregated to the sector
level results indicate that the birth regions of the current political leader are significantly less
likely than average to receive communication aid and significantly more likely to receive emer-
gency and transportation aid. As an exception, our most rigorous specification does consis-
tently indicate significant political preferencing in the social sector. Although, this result is
based on a small number of project locations (n = 92) and should be interpreted with caution.
The small number of observations contributing to the identification with region level fixed
effects is the most likely reason for inconsistency in findings. The maximum number of obser-
vations is 10,485 from 699 ADM1 regions in 44 countries. However, not all of these observa-
tions contribute to the identification in the birth region effect. In the regressions with region-
fixed effects, for total aid 6,420 observations are from region and years with no variation in our
dependent variable, so that coefficients are identified based on the variation from the remain-
ing, 4,065 observations. When examining this at the sector level the reduction in observations
is more drastic ranging from only 232 observations in the agriculture section to 1,470 in the
health sector.
6.3 Specification tests
We followed Deb and Norton and systematically evaluated the four main modelling choices in
two-part models[54]. First, we specified a probit model for the first part of the two-part model.
As a check we also specified a logit and the results in terms of marginal effects were nearly
identical indicating that there was not a substantial difference between the logit and probit.
The other choices in model specifications have wider implications. As previously reported, the
aid flows were highly skewed, so Box-Cox transformation to normality was used for this
model. We implemented the Box-Cox transformation in two ways with and without
Table 7. Marginal effects for total aid by sector II, ADM1, 2000–2014.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Total Aid Agriculture Communication Education Emergency Energy Government Health Social Transportation
Birth Region 0.035 0.008 -0.088�� -0.010 0.643��� 0.041 0.048 -0.078 0.121��� 0.118��
(0.033) (0.016) (0.040) (0.058) (0.056) (0.069) (0.083) (0.052) (0.044) (0.053)
Observations 4,065 232 774 966 366 897 420 1,470 602 1,410
ADM1 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
The key independent variable of interest is birth region. All models control for capital region, nighttime lights, population, area, ports, oil, mines, road density, polity, 2
year leads and lags for birth regions and included region (ADM1) fixed effects
Dependent variable is a binary variable with the value of one if one or more Chinese aid projects have been committed to an ADM1 region in a given year, and zero
otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at ADM1 level
��� p<0.01
�� p<0.05, � p<0.1
Results are presented as marginal effects
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232126.t007
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controlling for covariates. In both cases, the estimated coefficient is close to zero correspond-
ing to the natural log transformation. In order to determine the distribution family we used a
modified Park test to examine the relationship between the mean and the variable. For our
sample, we observed an estimated coefficient of 1.69 indicating the use of the gamma distribu-
tion. In summary, for choices two and three the specification tests support the use of the log
link and gamma distributions. Finally, we used a Pregibon’s link test to assess the reliability of
the model specification. This test was not significant at the 5% level and consequently we did
not add or alter any variables in the model.
7. Discussion
This research investigated whether and how political preferencing of Chinese aid differs across
sectors. Our method substantiates the work of Dreher[11] by providing evidence that African
leaders allocate substantial additional resources to their home regions. First, this research pro-
vides evidence that political preferencing does exist within some Chinese aid sectors (social,
emergency, and energy), and not among others. This sector-specific analysis provides a more
nuanced picture of Chinese aid than previous analyses that determine the presence of political
preference according to aggregate aid flows [11]. The sectors where political preferencing
exists are also those sectors that are typically associated with limited counterfactual-based pro-
gram evaluation [55,56]. The use of impact evaluation to inform programming helps, as
researchers for the Center for Global Development note, to “improve the effectiveness of
spending and development assistance by bringing vital knowledge into the service of policy-
making and program design”[57]. The results of this paper support the need for linking impact
measurement and accountability particularly within the social, emergency, and transportation
sectors. Second, this research supports the need within the development community for con-
tinued transparency of Chinese aid flows at the lowest levels of disaggregation possible. Such
transparency generates incentives at the planning and administrative phase as well as an
opportunity to conduct due diligence to avoid preferencing [58]. Although China is not held
to aid principles like OECD member countries, given its recent establishment of a unified aid
agency and frequent criticism from the international community regarding its programmatic
standards, such due diligence may bolster China’s reputation as a responsible donor and
improve the effectiveness of its programs [59].
Other research might address the current study’s limitations. Since we observe financial val-
ues at the project level and not the project-location level, project amounts are spread equally
across all project locations. This practice is consistent with AidData’s Chinese aid geocoded
dataset and other spatially referenced aid flows to Africa. However, it creates an artificially
homogenous allocation of project aid across locations within a country. Another modeling
challenge is the large fraction of observations with zero financial values, and our two-part
model can only partially address this issue; future research could be based on a stronger com-
ponent of financial variables. Although a power analysis was conducted at the .80 level, there
are a small amount of observations for the second part of our two-part model which could
limit its ability to detect a positive effect when one is to be detected. To partially deal with this
issue, we included in our model-clustered standard errors at the region level. Finally, future
work can also build on the theoretical underpinnings of this work. Specifically why we would
expect certain sectors to be more prone to favoritism by further disaggregating aid flows and
examining them at the sector level. A more nuanced understanding of the types of projects
that are preferenced is needed in order to further explain allocation motivations by sector.
It is plausible that recipients approach aid effectiveness differently within sectors that justify
additional aid flows. For example, reporting requirements from other donors may lead to less
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preference than aid from a country such as China with limited reporting requirements [23].
Finally, this research is not causally identified, so we do not know the extent that political pre-
ferencing of Chinese aid diminishes its ultimate development impact. Despite these limita-
tions, this research provides a valuable contribution to the literature by telling a more nuanced
story of Chinese aid. This research avoids categorizing Chinese aid in general terms and
instead focuses on individual variations by sector. The results of this paper support the need
for continued transparency of Chinese aid flows. Specifically to support the new policy frame-
work for measuring aid flows designed to target SDGs. Such transparency generates incentives
among corrupt governments to assess costs related to compliance with donor goals across dif-
ferent foreign aid sectors, thereby benefiting the most vulnerable on the African continent
[58].
The paper’s results are not generalizable to other donors, but given China’s growing impor-
tance in foreign aid, they have great significance. One plausible explanation for this paper’s
findings is that when provided the discretion to do so, political leaders may have more flexibil-
ity to preference categories of aid that have fewer reporting requirements. For instance, proj-
ect-based aid flows may be more insulated from government influence than program-based
aid, because project-based aid may be more likely to answer a perceived emergency. Second,
sectors that rank highly in terms of policy priorities, such as those related to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), carry greater incentives to implement aid effectively than sectors
such as aid to the social sector. This paper illuminates which components of that aid are subject
to political capture through preferencing; future research should examine how political prefer-
encing interacts with ultimate development impact.
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